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1. Introduction 
 
The birth of the EMU featured almost unprecedented transfer of sovereignty from the 
European member states to a newly created European institution. Ever since, the 
monetary policy has been the sole responsibility of the ECB at least for the countries in 
the Eurozone. The budgetary policy though still belongs to the domain of the European 
member states. However, they are not completely free to pursue there own budgetary 
policy as this is subject of economic governance or either coordination by the SGP.  
Sound public finances are considered to be a necessary, though not sufficient condition 
for price stability. 
 
The financial crisis and notably the situation in Greece brought a number of new 
instruments. In addition to a framework for crisis management, the Task Force on 
Strengthening Economic Governance called for broader and deeper policy coordination 
through the introduction of a so-called European Semester, allowing the European 
institutions to assess the draft budget and to come up with recommendations before it is 
submitted to national parliaments. In this paper we will critically assess the various 
proposals that have been done to reinforce budgetary coordination, addressing the 
question what would make the European member states comply under the new rules of 
the game where they did not under the old ones. 
 
 
2. The Call for a Gouvernement Economique 
 
The term ‘gouvernement économique’ was coined by Pierre Bérégovoy during the run-
up to the Maastricht treaty. In the French draft of the EMU-treaty he insisted that 
everywhere in the world, central banks in charge of monetary policy were in dialogue 
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with the governments in charge of the rest of economic policy. The ignorance of this 
parallelism between economic and monetary matters could easily lead to failure [quoted 
in Howarth 2007: 1067]. In addition, he proposed that the European Council, on the 
basis of ECOFIN reports, would define the broad orientations for both monetary and the 
economic policy. Within these orientations, the ECB would manage the European 
monetary policy and the ECOFIN would co-ordinate the policies of European member 
states and make recommendations to individual governments. The French draft treaty 
sought to limit the margin of maneuver of the ECB as much as possible
2
. 
 
The French government called for the creation of an economic government just before 
they took over the presidency on July 1, 2008, but had to withdraw because of the 
opposition led by Germany who saw it as a threat to the ECB and the common monetary 
union. 
 
In a speech about the global financial crisis for European Parliament on October 21, 
2008 the French president Nicolas Sarkozy reiterated his proposal for the establishment 
an economic government to work with the European Central Bank and help finances 
within the Eurozone: 
 
‘… c’est qu’il n’est pas possible que la zone euro continue sans un gouvernement 
économique clairement identifié. On ne peut plus continuer comme cela. Je veux 
rendre hommage à l’action de la BCE, je veux dire ma conviction que la BCE doit 
être indépendante mais pour que l’action de la BCE trouve toute sa pleine mesure 
elle doit pouvoir discuter avec un gouvernement économique. C’était cela, l’esprit 
du traité. L’esprit du traité, c’est le dialogue, la démocratie et l’indépendance 
réciproque. Et dans mon esprit d’ailleurs, le vrai gouvernement économique de 
l’Eurogroupe c’est un Eurogroupe, qui se réunit au niveau des chefs d’Etat et de 
gouvernement’ [Sarkozy 2008]. 
 
At the joint press conference,  the French president received support from the president 
of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, though he was afraid to jeopardize 
the independent status of the ECB and consequently to put the common monetary policy 
at risk: 
 
‘Nous sommes pour un renforcement de tous les mécanismes de coordination des 
politiques économiques de l’Europe, des états européens. En même temps, je crois 
qu’il ne faut pas créer l’illusion qui serait, à mon avis, très dangereuse, de donner 
des instructions à la Banque centrale ou ne pas mettre en cause l’indépendance de 
la Banque centrale, mettre en cause aussi l’acquis communautaire, le Traité de 
Rome et tous nos acquis’ [Barroso 2008]. 
                                                 
2. He also argued in favor of giving the ministers of economics and finance control over exchange rate 
policy 
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The president of the Eurogroup, Jean-Claude Juncker, while sympathetic with a 
concerted action to cope with the consequences of the financial crisis, stated that the 
Eurogroup was quite able to deal with these issues and that there was no need to 
institutionalize a meeting at such a high level. 
 
The issue of an economic government has been put back on the agenda by the Spanish 
prime minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero on April 28, 2009 after a visit of Nicolas 
Sarkozy to Madrid. 
 
‘I agreed with president Sarkozy that if the European Union really wants to be a 
political union, which works for its citizens, it has to have much more solid 
economic government and tools’ [Phillips 2009]. 
 
Most recently, the president of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, talking about the EU after 
the crisis envisaged a ‘confederation of sovereign states of a new type’: 
 
‘In this Union of tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, would it be too bold, in 
economic field, with a single market, a single currency and a single central bank, 
to envisage a ministry of finance of the Union?’ [Trichet 2011a]3. 
 
The creation of an economic government is misleading for it suggests as has been 
argued correctly by Jacquet & Pisani-Ferry that something like a government exists or is 
about to exist in Europe. Since, the economic situation has changed substantially, but 
economic government should not be confused with economic governance that refers to 
‘a plurality of actors and the necessity to define and adopt ‘best practice’ in a number of 
economic areas’ [Jacquet & Pisani-Ferry 2000: 14]. To put it differently the first is 
referring to a supranational mode of governance, the latter to a more intergovernmental 
mode of governance, including private actors. 
 
At least four objectives of economic governance can be discerned from French policy 
statements [Howarth 2007]: 
 
1. Economic governance as an ‘effective policy mix’ aimed at the increase of 
economic growth and employment 
2. Economic governance as interventionism, for instance by job creation strategies and 
infrastructure programs. 
3. Economic governance as credibility building in order to improve the legitimacy of 
the ECB and the common monetary policy. 
                                                 
3. One may argue that either the president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, or the 
president of the Eurogroup, Jean-Claude Juncker, is already serving in that capacity, but both are 
chairing an intergovernmental group rather than a supranational body.  
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4. Economic governance as explicit challenge to the goals and independence of the 
ECB and the common monetary policy. 
 
In this context, we are primarily concerned with the first, although the various modes of 
economic governance are not completely independent of each other. We will then zoom 
in on the coordination of fiscal and/or budgetary policy of the European member states. 
 
 
3. The Van Rompuy Task Force on Economic Governance 
 
In the spring of 2010 the European Council discussed Europe 2020, A New European 
Strategy for Jobs and Growth. One of the outcomes was a Task Force on Economic 
Governance that has been commissioned to generate measures needed to reach the 
objective of an improved crisis resolution framework and better budgetary discipline, 
exploring all options to reinforce the legal framework [EC Conclusions 25/26 March 
2010 EUCO 7/10]. 
 
The task force was chaired by the President of the European Council, Herman van 
Rompuy, and composed of representatives [primarily the Minister of Finance] of all 
member states. In addition, Jean Claude Juncker, chairman of the Eurogroup and Olli 
Rehn, Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and Jean-Claude Trichet, 
president of the ECB, participated in the work of the task force
4
. The preparatory has 
been done by a group of a Sherpa’s a group of personal representatives of the Heads of 
State and Government, chaired by the Head of Cabinet [?] of the president of the 
European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso]
5
. 
 
The mission of the task force can be split into four objectives: 
 
1. The reinforcement of economic governance, in institutional terms, in order to be 
able to act more quickly and in a more coordinated and efficient manner. 
2. The achievement of greater budgetary discipline, i.e. the reinforcement and 
effectiveness of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
3. The reduction of the divergences in competitiveness in order to reach a more even 
economic development within the European Union, and in particular, in the euro 
area. 
                                                 
4. Note that the rotating president of the Council of Ministers was not invited to participate in the task 
force. 
5. The task force has met six times. The first meeting took place on May 21, 2010, the last on October 
18, 2010. Twice, the chairman Herman van Rompuy, delivered an interim report to the European 
Council on June 17, respectively September 16, 2010. The report has been endorsed by the European 
Council on October 29-30, 2010. 
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4. The establishment of an effective crisis mechanism in order to be able to deal with 
problems such as the consequences of the financial crisis. 
 
In this paper I focus on the first two objectives even though the other two constitute the 
new elements in architecture of economic governance as my main interest is in [the 
reinforcement of] fiscal governance in the eurozone. 
 
The European Council welcomes the progress report of the President of the Task Force 
on economic governance delivered at the EC on June 17, 2010 and agreed on a first set 
of orientations regarding the strengthening and implementation of the present rules on 
budgetary discipline: 
 
a. The reinforcement of both the preventive and corrective arms of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, with sanctions attached to the consolidation path towards the medium 
term objective; 
b. A much more prominent role to levels and evolutions of debt and overall 
sustainability in budgetary surveillance, as originally foreseen in the Stability and 
Growth Pact; 
c. A change of the timetable for the submission of the stability and convergence 
reports in the context of a European semester, taking account of national budgetary 
procedures; 
d. The alignment of national budgetary rules and medium term budgetary frameworks 
with the Stability and Growth Pact; 
e. The assurance of the quality of statistical data, essential for a sound budgetary 
policy and budgetary surveillance. To that purpose statistical offices should be fully 
independent for data provision. 
 
The report of the task force has been endorsed by the European Council on October 28-
29, 2010. The conclusions can be categorized in roughly five areas, respectively aiming 
at: 
 
1. A reinforcement of fiscal discipline, notably through a stronger Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) 
2. A broadening of economic surveillance to encompass macro imbalances and 
competitiveness 
3. A deepening and broadening of policy coordination through the European Semester 
4. A robust framework for crisis management 
5. The strengthening institutions for more effective economic governance 
 
Taken separately, some of these reforms may seem to be small steps, but taken together 
they constitute what Jean Claude Trichet, the president of the ECB, has called a 
‘quantum leap’ in economic governance.  
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4. A New Architecture of Economic Governance 
 
From the very start, the asymmetry between the monetary policy and economic, notably 
fiscal policy has been a concern [Verdun 1996; Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 28-33; 
765-768]. Most recently former commissioner Mario Monti plead for compensation by 
paying more attention for the E in the build-up of the EMU and the single currency 
[Monti 2011]. The new architecture of economic governance is composed of three 
pillars of which the procedure for fiscal and structural policy were already more or less 
in place. However, as we will see they are reinforced and brought into an overall 
framework, called European semester that is geared to the objectives of the Euro 2020 
strategy. 
 
 
Figure 1: The New Architecture of Economic Governance 
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We will focus now on the proposals that have put at the table to reinforce fiscal 
governance. Note that the European semester is applicable to all member states whereas 
the reform of the SGP is only referring to the member states in the Eurozone. 
 
 
5. The European Semester 
 
One of the most far reaching proposals, at least potentially, of the task force is the 
introduction of the so-called European Semester. Being presented for the first time in 
2004 [European Commission 2008: 258], the European Commission argued in its 
communication to, inter alia, the European Council that the time was ripe for a new 
effort to coordinate the budgetary policy of the member states on the principle that 
‘prevention is more effective than correction’ [COM (2010) 250 Final]. It integrates 
existing procedures in for fiscal and structural policies, such as under the SGP and 
BEPGs and the Employment Guidelines
6
, in the context of the Europe 2020 strategy. In 
addition, it extends the domain of surveillance to macroeconomic imbalances. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Cycle of Ex Ante of Policy Coordination; The European Semester 
 
 
Source: com_367_european_semester_en 
 
 
The new cycle is takes six-months and kicks-off each year with the Annual Growth 
Survey [AGS] that serves as the basis for a discussion at the annual spring meeting of 
the European Council about the main challenges that the EU is facing in the coming 
years. The member states will then submit their Stability and Convergence Reports 
                                                 
6. The BEPGs and Employment Guidelines are combined since the period 2005-2008 in the Integrated 
Guidelines for Growth and Jobs. 
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[SCRs] and National Reform Programs [NRPs], outlining the actions in areas such as 
employment research and innovation, energy and social inclusion. The cycle is 
completed with country-specific policy advice of the European Council and the Council 
of Ministers that the member states have to take into account when finalizing their 
budgets for next year. 
 
As for fiscal surveillance, the European Semester basically sets a new timetable for the 
submission of the Stability and Convergence Reports [SCRs]. Being due in the fall 
previously, they have to be submitted from now onwards in the spring in order to enable 
EU to coordinate ex ante both budgetary and economy policy of the member states. 
 
The proposal has been more or less accepted before the ink of the report was dry
7
. The 
heads of states and governments adopted the European semester on September 7, 2010 
when the ECOFIN endorsed changes in the code of conduct regarding the 
implementation of SGP in order to allow the European semester to be introduced in 
2011 as part of a reform of EU provisions on economic policy coordination. 
 
 
6. Six-pack 
 
About the same time, to be precisely on September 29, 2010 the European Commission 
issued a bunch of measures to reinforce economic governance, popularly known as ‘six 
pack’ of legislative measures – three new regulations, two amendments of current 
regulations and a directive – of which four that have to do with fiscal consolidation. The 
other two deal with microeconomic imbalances [COM (2010) 522-527], expanding the 
existing system of surveillance to macroeconomic imbalance, introducing a system that 
is alike the system in operation regarding fiscal surveillance. In this paper we focus on 
the consequences for fiscal consolidation. 
 
 
6.1 The Preventive Arm 
 
The medium-term objectives [MTO] are key in the process of fiscal surveillance. 
Originally set at ‘… close to balance or in surplus’, they have been made country-
specific in the revision of the SGP of 2005 in order to take national differences into 
account. They range between -1.0% of GDP and balance or surplus, in cyclically 
adjusted terms, net of one-off and temporary measures for member states in the 
Eurozone as well as in ERM2 [Council Regulation 2005]. 
 
                                                 
7. The European Semester has been endorsed by the European Council on June 17, 2010 and validated 
by the European Council on October 28-29, 201. It has been launched on January 12, 2011 with a 
conference on the Annual Growth Survey [AGS] in Brussels. 
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The progress towards MTOs has been ‘generally insufficient, leaving public finances 
badly exposed to the economic downturn’ [COM(2010) 526 Final] as illustrated by a 
survey conducted by the Commission as part of the Public Finances in EMU 2010. 
None of the member states is expected to achieve its MTO in the next few years with 
the exception of Bulgaria which is predicted to attain its MTO from 2010 onwards 
although the structural balance is deteriorating over time [European Commission 
2010:15]. In most cases even no target are set for goal-attainment. 
 
In order to compensate for these shortcomings the path towards the MTOs they are from 
now on directed by the ‘principle of prudent fiscal policy making’, that basically curbs 
government expenditures to avoid that windfalls on the revenue side are spent instead of 
being used for debt reduction. A distinction should be made between member states that 
achieved their MTOs and member states which have not yet reached their MTOs. In the 
first case, the annual growth rate of government expenditures may not exceed the 
prudent medium term rate of GDP growth
8
. In the latter case, the annual growth rate 
will be set at a lower level than the prudent medium-term rate of GDP growth in such a 
way as to ensure that appropriate adjustments are made towards the medium-term 
budgetary objective.  
 
The preventive arm of the SGP has been further strengthened by an enforcing 
mechanism. A member state that does not take the principle of prudent fiscal policy 
making into account is liable to a warning from the Commission and ultimately a 
recommendation [TFEU 121] backed by an interest bearing deposit of 0.2 percent of 
GDP for those countries whose currency is the euro [TFEU 136]
9
. The decision to 
impose a sanction is subject of the ‘reversed voting mechanism’, i.e. a proposal of the 
Commission will be adopted unless it is rejected by the Council within ten days. 
Decisions are made by QMV and restricted to member states in the Eurozone, leaving 
out the vote of the member state under scrutiny. 
 
 
6.2 The Corrective Arm 
 
The reform of the SGP of 2005 featured a list of relevant variables – the impact of the 
cycle, the level of debt, a period of slow growth and productivity-enhancing procedures 
– that the Council should take into account when declaring a member state in derogation 
regarding the reference value of the budget deficit. The implementation of the SGP and, 
more specifically the EDP is completed by a more prominent role of the debt criterion: 
 
                                                 
8. The prudent medium-term of growth will be assessed on the basis of projections over a ten-year 
horizon updated at regular intervals. 
9. The deposit will be returned with accrued interest once the Council considers that the deviation is 
corrected.  
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‘While the deficit and the debt criterion are in principle on an equal footing, and 
persistently high levels of debt arguably represent a more serious threat to public 
finance sustainability than occasionally high deficits, in practice the ‘3% of GDP’ 
threshold has been the almost exclusive focus of the EDP, with debt playing a 
marginal role so far’ [EC (2010) 522]. 
 
The budget deficit and the consequent debt service is one of the many variables that 
shape the debt and provide as such a separate argument to pay more attention to the 
debt. It has made operational by the adoption of a numerical benchmark. Specifically, a 
debt-to-GDP ratio above 60% is to be considered sufficiently diminishing if its distance 
with respect to the 60% of GDP reference value has reduced over the previous three 
years at a rate of the order of one-twentieth per year.  
 
In line with the greater emphasis on debt, more consideration should be given to 
relevant factors in the event of non-compliance with the deficit criterion, if a country 
has a debt below the 60% of GDP threshold. 
 
The enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the Eurozone is further strengthened by a 
more timely action as sanctions  
 
‘… arguably come into play too late in the process to represent an effective 
deterrent against gross fiscal policy errors, not least because the financial 
situation of the country concerned may have deteriorated so much as to make the 
threat of a fine less credible at the very time when it should become real’ 
[European Commission, COM (2010) 522] 
 
A new set of financial sanctions for euro-area, which would apply much earlier in the 
process , i.e. the Commission may issue a proposal for sanctions from the very start and 
at each step of the EDP and not only in last resort
10
. Moreover, sanctions – a non-
interest bearing deposit to be turned into a fine in case of non-compliance – are semi-
automatic as the decision is subject of the ‘reversed voting mechanism’, leaving out the 
vote of the member state in derogation. 
 
 
7. Budgetary Framework of the Member States 
 
The reform of the SGP is completed with a directive on the requirements for budgetary 
frameworks as: 
                                                 
10. The imposition of sanctions in an early stage of the EDP is due to an intervention of European 
Parliament, supported by the Commission and ECB, that has made more than 2000 amendments in the 
‘six pack’. 
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‘Effective enforcement of the EMU budgetary coordination framework cannot be 
expected to derive only from provisions laid down at EU level. The particular 
decentralised nature of fiscal policy-making in the EU and the general need for 
national ownership of EU rules make it essential that the objectives of the EMU 
budgetary coordination framework are reflected in the national budgetary 
frameworks’ [COM (2010) 522: 6]. 
 
Next to the alignment of national systems to minimum standards set at the European 
level [accounting, statistics, forecasting], countries in the Eurozone should adopt rules 
that effectively promote compliance with their obligations under the Treaty in the area 
of budgetary policy [COM (2010) 523 Final: Art. 5], notably: 
 
 The reference value of the budget deficit and public debt as well as other key 
variables; 
 A multi-annual fiscal planning horizon of at least three years as a single year 
provides a poor basis for a sound budgetary policy. 
 
The proposals can be organized in roughly four categories of budgetary requirements: 
 
 Numerical rules, such as a balance budget [constitutional amendment], a revenue 
rule, an expenditure rule or debt rule. 
 Independent budget institutions that effectively and timely monitor compliance of 
the numerical fiscal rules
11
. 
 Medium term budgetary perspective, extending the horizon to at least three years 
 Budgetary procedures such as more centralization and top-down budgeting 
 
A survey conducted by the Commission indicates that elements of a budgetary 
framework is already in place in most member states, in many cases even more than 
one. In many countries there is more than one numerical rule, in some countries – 
Denmark and France – even five. Only Malta is lagging behind. The same applies to the 
number of independent institutions with Denmark again as front-runner and Austria as 
runner up. However there is no such a thing as an independent institutions in 10 of the 
27 member states [Annex 3]. 
 
                                                 
11. The establishment of independent national budget office refers to standing practice in countries as 
Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden [ECOFIN 596] 
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Figure 3: Budgetary Frameworks in the EU-27 [FY 2008] 
 
Source: Ayuso-i-Casals 2010 
 
 
New is that the budgetary requirements should be transposed in national rules and 
regulations. The transposition of the directive should be completed before December 31, 
2013. 
 
 
8. A Balance Sheet 
 
The question may be raised if the new architecture of economic governance is going to 
work: will it lead to budgetary discipline inducing fiscal consolidation: a reduction of 
the deficit in order to avoid debt accumulation?
12
 A number of arguments are pleading 
in favor of the new set-up which constitutes a revision of the existing SGP rather than 
the establishment of a completely new architecture
13
. First, the draft budget – stability 
and convergence reports – are now due in the spring so that they not only codify, but 
may also modify the fiscal plans for coming year. In the past recommendations came 
often too late as the stability and convergence reports were due in the fall, ‘… simply 
reporting what they have already passed into law’ [Hallerberg 2010: 8]. Besides, fiscal 
governance is now directed by a numerical rules , curbing expenditures and backed by a 
enforcing mechanism – an interest bearing deposit in the preventive arm and a non-
interest bearing deposit to be converted into a fine in the corrective arm – that may be 
invoked in an earlier stage of the procedure. Last, but not least it has become more 
difficult to avoid sanctions as the decision to impose penalties is subject of the ‘reversed 
                                                 
12. Fiscal consolidations is measured as a reduction of the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance 
[OECD 2010]. 
13. The main innovation is the introduction of the European semester and the resulting expansion of the 
surveillance to macroeconomic imbalances. 
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voting mechanism’. However, the door is not completely closed as the final say is left in 
the hands of the member states
14
, which may lead to the conclusion that the 
effectiveness of fiscal governance is sacrificed at the altar of sovereignty of the member 
states. The experience from the past in that regard is not very promising. After all, the 
SGP has been watered down in 2005 due a clique between France and Germany for 
different reasons, but with same effect and the same applies to the proposal of the 
Commission and supported by the ECB and EP to complete the new architecture of 
economic governance with automatic sanctions
15
. 
 
The sting is drawn from the proposal at the informal gathering of Angela Merkel and 
Nicolas Sarkozy at Deauville on October 18, 2010 while the Ministers of Finance were 
meeting in Luxembourg to deal with the consequences of the financial crisis. In an in-
depth reconstruction of the Irish situation based on dozens of interviews with European 
officials, reporters of The Wall Street Journal revealed that automatic sanctions that 
were pursued by Germany and supported by Finland and the Netherlands as well as the 
ECB, were traded-off for a change of the ‘no bailout clause’ [TFEU, Article 125] 
through a simplified procedure for the revision of the treaty that would enable member 
states to support each other: 
 
‘Ms. Merkel proposed a compromise. Germany would drop it is demand for 
automatic sanctions, but in exchange, the chancellor wanted France to support an 
idea her advisers had worked on for months: In the future, if a eurozone country 
needed a bailout, its bondholders would have to accept a reduction on what they 
were owed, known as a ‘haircut’ [Forelle et al. 2010]. 
 
The compromise, known as the Deauville Pact, generated so much turmoil that Angela 
Merkel was forced to water down the application of ‘haircuts’: bondholders would only 
face losses when ‘a country were formally deemed insolvent by all other euro-zone 
members’. It paved to way for the conversion of the temporary European Financial 
Stability Facility [EFSF] into a permanent European Stability Mechanism [ESM]. On 
December 16, 2010 the European Council agreed with the addition of a new paragraph 
to TFEU, Art. 136 that deals with the member states whose currency is the euro, 
reading: 
 
‘The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability 
mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro 
                                                 
14. The decision to impose sanctions is made by qualified majority of the countries whose currency is the 
euro, i.e. 9 out of 17. In addition they need 74 percent of the voting rights that accumulate to 213 
votes. The votes of the country under scrutiny though should be left out. At request of one or more 
countries will be checked of the countries in favor of the decision represent 62 percent of the 
population. Note though that the Council is pursuing consensus and that not often votes are taken. 
15. The imposition of automatic sanction would require an amendment of the Lisbon-treaty which would 
be justified in order to deal with economic crises effectively, but turned to be a ‘bridge too far’. 
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area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the 
mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality’. 
 
We turn back now to the proposals that have been put at the table for the reinforcement 
of fiscal governance. What are the consequences for the member states in terms of 
sovereignty? At face value they do not constitute an infringement on the sovereignty of 
the member states in the field of budgetary policy. The prerogative of the member states 
is left untouched [Memo/11/14]. However, behind that veil we feature an almost 
unprecedented transfer to the European level of governance. Obviously, it is far too 
early to judge, but the European semester constitutes a potential threat for national 
sovereignty in the field of budgetary policy as the draft budget should be submitted to 
the Commission before it is sent off to national parliament. It will make the 
Commission ‘… less of an impartial referee and more of an active player in domestic 
politics’ [Charlemagne 2010]. The composition of the budget – taxation and allocation – 
may be left to national governments and parliaments, but the parameters are set at the 
European level
16
. The discretionary power of the member states to pursue a budgetary 
policy of their own may become victim to what Philippe Schmitter has coined 
‘European integration by stealth’. It is paving the way to an economic government with 
a European minister of Finance in charge of a common budgetary policy rather than a 
strengthening of economic governance for which the Eurogroup seems to be the more 
appropriate platform. 
                                                 
16. In addition, the strings are picked up regarding the path towards the MTO to provide for a safety 
margin with respect to the reference value for the budget deficit 
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Annex 1: Summary of the SGP reform 
 
Sanctions under the preventive arm of the SGP 
Current rules Recommendation by the Task Force 
In case of deviation from the adjustment path: 
 
• Early warning by the Commission 
• Council may address a recommendation 
setting a deadline for correcting the deviation. 
The recommendation may be made public. 
In case of deviation from the adjustment path: 
 
• Early warning by the Commission 
• Council recommendation (within one month) 
setting a deadline for correcting the deviation. 
The recommendation may be made public. 
 
 • Interest-bearing deposit applies if no 
appropriate action is taken within a maximum 
of five months (three months in serious cases). 
 
 
Sanctions under the corrective arm of the SGP 
Current rules Recommendation by the Task Force 
When Member States are placed in Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP), a deadline of 6 
months is given to take effective action to 
correct the situation (article 126.6) 
 
When Member States are placed in EDP, two 
possibilities: 
 
• Non-interest bearing deposit will be applied 
immediately for Member States that have 
already been subject to financial sanctions 
under the preventive arm. 
• For those Member States that have not been 
sanctioned under the preventive arm, the 
Council will adopt a recommendation setting a 
deadline for effective action. However, in case 
of particularly serious slippages, sanctions 
could be applied immediately. 
 
When warranted by the situation, the steps 
under the EDP should be accelerated (e.g. 3 
months rather than 6 for effective action) 
 
If no effective action has been taken within the 
given deadline, the Council may make its 
recommendation public (article 126.8). It may 
also give notice to the Member State concerned to 
take measures to reduce the deficit (article 126.9). 
 
If no effective action is taken within the given 
deadline, Member States will be subject to a fine. 
 
If the Member State persists in failing to comply 
with the Council recommendations, the Council 
may apply sanctions (article 126.11) 
 
If a Member State persists in failing to put into 
practice the Council recommendation, the fine 
will be increased, including a variable component 
related to the level of the deficit. 
 
 
Source: European Council Secretariat 
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Annex 2: Budgetary Developments 2009-2012 
 
 
Annex 3: Domestic Fiscal Frameworks 
 
